Special thanks to Professors
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Ada JoAnn Taylor sat quietly in a nondescript chair contemplating her choices.
1 On a cold February evening four years earlier, a sixty-eight-year-old woman was brutally victimized in Beatrice, Nebraska.
2 Police were now convinced that Taylor and five others were responsible for the woman's death. 3 The options for Taylor were stark. 4 If she pleaded guilty and cooperated with prosecutors, she would be rewarded 3 But see id.
("An FBI analysis of the Wilson murder and the three other [related] crimes concluded that 'we can say with almost total certainty that this crime was committed by one individual acting alone.'"). 4 See id.
bargaining in the United States, including an examination of the current debate regarding the prevalence of plea bargaining's innocence problem.
21
In Part III, this Article discusses the psychological study of plea bargaining conducted by the authors. 22 This Part reviews the methodology and results of the study. 23 Finally, Part III analyzes the constitutional limits placed on plea bargaining by the Supreme Court in its landmark 1970 decision, Brady v. United States. 24 In this decision, the Supreme Court stated that plea bargaining was a tool for use only when the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the defendant might benefit from the opportunity to bargain. 25 According to the Court, if it became evident that plea bargaining was being used more broadly to create incentives for questionably guilty defendants to "falsely condemn themselves," the entire institution of plea bargaining and its constitutionality would require reexamination. 26 Perhaps, as a result of this new study, a time for such reevaluation has arrived.
II. THE HISTORICAL RISE OF PLEA BARGAINING AND ITS INNOCENCE PROBLEM
On December 23, 1990, a twenty-one-year-old woman was robbed and sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant in New Jersey. 27 Three days after the attack, and again a month later, the victim identified John Dixon as the perpetrator from a photo array. 28 Dixon was arrested on January 18, 1991, and ventured down a road familiar to criminal defendants in the United States. 29 Threatened by prosecutors with a higher prison sentence if he failed to cooperate and confess to his alleged crimes, Dixon pleaded guilty to sexual assault, kidnapping, robbery, and unlawful possession of a weapon. 30 He received a sentence of forty-five years in prison. 31 Ten years 21 See infra Part II (discussing the historical rise of plea bargaining and its innocence problem). 22 See infra Part III (discussing the plea-bargaining study While the story of an innocent man pleading guilty and serving a decade in prison before exoneration is a tragedy, perhaps it should not be surprising given the prominence and power of plea bargaining in today's criminal justice system.
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Plea bargaining, however, was not always such a dominant force in the United States. 34 In fact, when appellate courts first began to see an influx of such bargains around the time of the American Civil War, most struck down the deals as unconstitutional. 35 Despite these early judicial rebukes, plea bargaining continued to linger in the shadows as a tool of corruption.
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Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1398 (2004) .
By the time of the plea allocution it is clear that the defendant has decided to take the plea bargain and knows or has been instructed by counsel to tell the court that he did indeed do the crime. Predictably, the National Institute of Justice survey found that judges rejected guilty pleas in only two percent of cases. Since efficiency and speed is the name of the game, it is not unexpected that meaningful questioning of the defendant does not occur and it is not surprising that the Institute concluded that the plea allocution procedure is "close to being a new kind of 'pious fraud. ' Then, in response to growing pressures on American courts due to overcriminalization in the early twentieth century, plea bargaining began a spectacular rise to power. 37 That today almost 97% of convictions in the federal system result from pleas of guilt, such as John Dixon's in New Jersey in 1991, is both a testament to the institution's resilience and a caveat about its power of persuasion. 38 A. THE RISE OF PLEA BARGAINING While most discussions regarding the rise of plea bargaining begin in the late nineteenth century, the full history of plea bargaining dates back hundreds of years to the advent of confession law. 39 As Professor Albert Alschuler noted, " [T] he legal phenomenon that we call a guilty plea has existed for more than eight centuries . . . [as] a 'confession. '" 40 Interestingly, early legal precedent regarding confessions prohibited the offering of any inducement to prompt the admission. 41 As an example, in the 1783 case of Rex v. Warickshall, an English court stated, " [A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given to it." 42 While plea bargaining as it exists today relies upon the use of incentives, common law prohibitions on such inducements persisted until well into the twentieth century. 39 See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 12. 40 See id. at 13. 41 See id. at 12. 42 See id. ("It soon became clear that any confession 'obtained by [a] direct or implied promise[], however slight' could not be received in evidence. Even the offer of a glass of gin was a 'promise of leniency' capable of coercing a confession." (footnotes omitted)). 43 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 65-66 (discussing the evolution of the doctrine that guilty pleas must be voluntary); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 657 (1981) ("Plea negotiation works . . . only because defendants have been led to believe that their bargains are in fact bargains. If this belief is erroneous, it seems likely that the defendants have been deluded into sacrificing their constitutional rights for nothing."); Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 77-78 (2009) ("Assuming that prosecutors seek to maximize and defendants seek to minimize sentences, the price of any plea should be the product of the anticipated trial sentence and the likelihood of conviction, discounted by
The first influx of plea-bargaining cases at the appellate level in the United States occurred shortly after the Civil War. 44 Relying on past confession precedent prohibiting the offering of incentives in return for admissions of guilt, various courts summarily rejected these bargains and permitted the defendants to withdraw their statements. 45 These early American appellate decisions, however, did not prevent plea bargaining from continuing to operate in the shadows. 46 Plea bargains continued to be used during this period, despite strong precedential condemnation, at least in part as a tool of corruption. 47 As an example, and as Professor Alschuler has previously noted, there are documented accounts that by 1914 a defense attorney in New York would "stand out on the street in front of the Night Court and dicker away sentences in this form: $300 for ten days, $200 for twenty days, $150 for thirty days."
48 Such bargains were not limited to New York. 49 One commentator in 1928 discussed the use of "fixers," who negotiated bargains between the government and the defense in Chicago, Illinois: some factor to reflect the resources saved by not having to try the case."). 44 See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 19-21. 45 See id. Alschuler provides several examples of statements made by the appellate courts examining plea bargains in the late nineteenth century.
The least surprise or influence causing [the defendant] to plead guilty when he had any defense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a change of the plea from guilty to not guilty.
. . .
No sort of pressure can be permitted to bring the party to forego any right or advantage however slight. The law will not suffer the least weight to be put in the scale against him.
[W]hen there is reason to believe that the plea has been entered through inadvertence . . . and mainly from the hope that the punishment to which the accused would otherwise be exposed may thereby be mitigated, the Court should be indulgent in permitting the plea to be withdrawn.
Id. at 20 (citations omitted). A legal annotation from the period stated:
We would conclude, from an examination of all the cases upon the subject, that where there is an inducement of any kind held out to the prisoner, by reason of which he enters the plea of guilty, it will . . . better comport with a sound judicial discretion to allow the plea to be withdrawn . . ., and especially so when counsel and friends represent to the accused that it has been the custom and common practice of the court to assess a punishment less than the maximum upon such a plea . . . . 47 See id. at 24 ("The gap between these judicial denunciations of plea bargaining [in the late nineteenth century] and the practices of many urban courts at the turn of the century and thereafter was apparently extreme. In these courts, striking political corruption apparently contributed to a flourishing practice of plea bargaining."). 48 Id. (citations omitted). 49 See id. at 24-25.
Id
This sort of person is an abomination and it is a serious indictment against our system of criminal administration that such a leech not only can exist but thrive. The "fixer" is just what the word indicates. As to qualifications, he has none, except that he may be a person of some small political influence.
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The use of plea bargaining by such "fixers" ensured that the practice would survive despite judicial repudiation, though a later phenomenon ultimately brought it out of the shadows.
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While corruption kept plea bargaining alive during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, overcriminalization necessitated plea bargaining's emergence into mainstream criminal procedure and its rise to dominance. 52 According to one analysis of individuals arrested in Chicago in 1912, "more than one half were held for violation of legal precepts which did not exist twenty-five years before." 53 As the number of criminal statutes-and, as a result, criminal defendants-swelled, court systems became overwhelmed. 54 In searching for a solution, prosecutors turned to bargained justice, the previous bastion of corruption, as a mechanism by which official and "legitimate" offers of leniency might ensure defendants waived their rights to trial and cleared cases from the dockets. 645-46 (2011) . Similarly, consider the significant ramifications that would follow should there no longer be overcriminalization:
The law would be refined and clear regarding conduct for which criminal liability may attach. Individual benefits, political pressure, and notoriety would not incentivize the invention of novel legal theories upon which to base liability where none otherwise exists, despite the already expansive size of the United States criminal code. Further, novel legal theories and overly-broad statutes would not be used to create staggering sentencing differentials that coerce defendants, even innocent ones, to falsely confess in return for leniency.
Id. at 645-46.
53 See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 32. 54 See Dervan, supra note 52, at 650 ("In return for agreeing not to challenge the government's legal assertions and for assisting in lessening the strain created by overcriminalization, defendants were permitted to plead guilty to reduced charges and in return for lighter sentences."). 55 See id. [Vol. 103 reliance on bargains during this period is evidenced by the observed rise in guilty plea rates.
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Between 1908 and 1916, the number of federal convictions resulting from pleas of guilty rose from 50% to 72%.
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The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and advent of the Prohibition era in 1919 only exacerbated the overcriminalization problem and required further reliance on plea bargaining to ensure the continued functionality of the justice system. 58 As George Fisher noted in his seminal work on plea bargaining, prosecutors had little option other than to continue attempting to create incentives for defendants to avoid trial. 59 By 1925, almost 90% of criminal convictions were the result of guilty pleas. 60 By the end of the Prohibition era, plea bargaining had successfully emerged from the shadows of the American criminal justice system to take its current place as an indispensable solution for an overwhelmed structure.
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Though plea-bargaining rates rose significantly in the early twentieth century, appellate courts were still reluctant to approve such deals when appealed. 62 For example, in 1936, Jack Walker was charged with armed robbery.
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In a scene common in today's criminal justice system, prosecutors threatened to seek a harsh sentence if Walker failed to cooperate, but offered a lenient alternative in return for a guilty plea.
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Facing a sentence twice as long if he lost at trial, Walker pleaded guilty. 59 See FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH, supra note 37, at 210; see also Alschuler, supra note 36, at 28 ("The rewards associated with pleas of guilty were manifested not only in the lesser offenses of which guilty-plea defendants were convicted but also in the lighter sentences that they received."). 60 Alschuler, supra note 36, at 27. 61 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 60 ("As Prohibition was extinguished, the United States continued its drive to create new criminal laws, a phenomenon that only added to the courts' growing case loads and the pressure to continue to use bargaining to move cases through the system."). [Walker] was deceived and coerced into pleading guilty when his real desire was to plead not guilty or at least to be advised by counsel as to his course. If he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel, or if he was deceived or coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, he was deprived of a constitutional right.
67
Once again, despite plea bargaining's continued presence in the court system, the Supreme Court was reluctant to embrace the notion of bargained justice and coerced confessions.
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By 1967, despite a continued rejection of plea bargaining by appellate courts, even the American Bar Association (ABA) was beginning to see the benefits of the practice. 69 In a report regarding the criminal justice system, the ABA noted that the use of plea bargaining allowed for the resolution of many cases without a trial, which was necessary given the system's lack of resources. 70 In particular, the report noted that "the limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for contesting the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption of innocence." 71 Id.
[A] high proportion of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the system. Such pleas tend to limit the trial process to deciding real disputes and, consequently, to reduce the need for funds and personnel. If the number of judges, courtrooms, court personnel and counsel for [Vol. 103
Three years after the ABA embraced plea bargaining as a necessary tool in an overburdened system, the United States Supreme Court finally directly addressed the constitutionality of modern plea bargaining in the case of Brady v. United States. 72 The case involved a defendant charged with kidnapping in violation of federal law. 73 The charged statute permitted the death penalty, but only where recommended by a jury. 74 This meant that a defendant could avoid capital punishment by pleading guilty. 75 Realizing his chances of success at trial were minimal given that his codefendant had agreed to testify against him, Brady pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fifty years in prison. 76 He later changed his mind, however, and sought to have his plea withdrawn, arguing that his act was induced by his fear of the death penalty.
77
Prior precedent regarding plea bargaining suggested that the Supreme Court would look with disfavor upon the defendant's decision to plead guilty in return for the more lenient sentence, but plea bargaining's rise during the previous century and its unique role by 1970 protected the practice from absolute condemnation. 78 Instead of finding plea bargaining unconstitutional, the Court acknowledged the necessity of the institution to protect crowded court systems from collapse. 79 The Court then went on to prosecution and defense were to be increased substantially, the funds necessary for such increases might be diverted from elsewhere in the criminal justice process. Moreover, the limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for contesting the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption of innocence. Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant. But nothing of the sort is claimed in this case; nor is there evidence that Brady was so gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope of leniency that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty.
Id
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The Court continued:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).
82
After Brady, plea bargaining was permitted and could fully emerge into the mainstream of the American criminal justice system. 83 As long as the plea was "voluntary," which meant that it was not induced "by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant," the bargain would be permitted.
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Plea bargaining continued its rise over the next four decades and, today, over 96% of convictions in the federal system result from pleas of guilt rather than decisions by juries. (2004) ("The overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal sentencing system, beyond the Commission and the guidelines and mandatory penalties, is the virtually absolute power the system has given prosecutors over federal prosecution and sentencing."); Boyd, supra note 86, at 591-92 ("While the main focus of the Sentencing Guidelines appeared to be narrowing judicial discretion in sentencing, some critics argued that the Sentencing Guidelines merely shifted the federal judges' discretionary power to federal prosecutors.").
88 See Alschuler, supra note 43, at 652-53. Professor Alschuler stated, "Criminal defendants today plead guilty in overwhelming numbers primarily because they perceive that this action is likely to lead to more lenient treatment than would follow conviction at trial. A number of studies suggest that this perception is justified." Id. (2003) ("The criminal justice system uses large sentence discounts to induce guilty pleas. Of course these discounts exert pressure on defendants to plead guilty."); Dervan, supra note 26, at 64 ("[P]lea bargaining's rise to dominance during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries resulted from prosecutors gaining increased power over the criminal justice system and, through such power, the ability to offer increasingly significant incentives to those willing to confess their guilt in court."); Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising Lessons from Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Terror, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 245 (2011) ("Key to the success of prosecutors' use of increasing powers to create incentives that attracted defendants was their ability to structure plea agreements that included significant differences between the sentence one received in return for pleading guilty and the sentence one risked if he or she lost at trial."). 89 One study analyzed robbery and burglary defendants in three California jurisdictions and found that defendants who went to trial received significantly higher sentences. (1995) ("Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the concepts of duress and consideration against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it more likely that a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the benefit offered in exchange for the guilty plea."). The Brereton and Casper study stated:
The point of the preceding discussion is simple enough: when guilty plea rates are high, expect to find differential sentencing. We believe that recent arguments to the effect that differentials are largely illusory do not withstand serious scrutiny, even though this revisionist challenge has been valuable in forcing us to examine more closely what is too often taken to be self-evidently true. [Vol. 103
Andrew Fastow, was accused of engaging in six counts of criminal conduct related to the collapse of the Texas energy giant. 90 Though conviction at trial under the original indictment carried a prison sentence of ten years under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the government offered Fastow a plea bargain. 91 In return for assisting in their prosecution, she would be eligible for a mere five months in prison. 92 With small children to consider and a husband who would certainly receive a lengthy prison sentence, Fastow accepted the offer. 93 The question that remained, however, was whether Fastow had pleaded guilty because she had committed the alleged offenses, or whether the plea bargaining machine had become so powerful that even innocent or questionably guilty defendants were now becoming mired in its powerful grips. 92 See Zucker, supra note 91, at 3. In Fastow's eventual plea agreement, the prosecutors used a federal misdemeanor charge as a mechanism by which to ensure the judge could not sentence Fastow beyond the terms of the arrangement. See Mary Flood, Fastows to Plead Guilty Today, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 14, 2004, at 1A.
93 See Greg Farrell & Jayne O'Donnell, Plea Deals Appear Close for Fastows, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2004, § B, at 1 ("One of the reasons that Lea Fastow wants to limit her jail time to five months is that she and her husband have two young children, and they're trying to structure their pleas so they're not both in jail at the same time."); see also Flood, supra note 92, at A1 ("The plea bargains for the Fastows, who said they wanted to be sure their two children are not left parentless, have been in limbo for more than a week."). It is unclear how many of the more than 96% of defendants who are convicted through pleas of guilt each year are actually innocent of the charged offenses, but it is clear that plea bargaining has an innocence problem. 95 As Professor Russell D. Covey has stated, "When the deal is good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether one believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factually innocent." 96 While almost all commentators agree with Covey's statement that some innocent defendants will be induced to plead guilty, much debate exists regarding the extent of this phenomenon. 97 Some argue that plea bargaining's innocence problem is significant significant leverage to virtually force even innocent, or at least questionably guilty, defendants to plead guilty." That plea bargaining represents something of an affront to the rule against coerced confessions has been oft-noted and more often ignored. The objections that have been leveled against plea bargaining are numerous and diverse, but most stem from a common problem: plea bargaining reduces the ability of the criminal justice system to avoid convicting the innocent.
Gilchrist, supra, at 148; see also Gazal-Ayal, supra note 95, at 2306 ("In all these cases, an innocent defendant might accept the offer in order to avoid the risk of a much harsher result if he is convicted at trial, and thereby plea bargaining could very well lead to the conviction of factually innocent defendants."); Leipold, supra note 95, at 1154 ("Yet we know that sometimes innocent people plead guilty, and we know some of the reasons why . . .
[S]ometimes the prosecutor offers such a generous discount for admitting guilt that the defendant feels he simply can't take the chance of going to trial."). 97 It is worth mentioning that 2009 ) ("Since trials are designed to reveal the truth, an innocent defendant would correctly estimate that his chances at trial are better than the prosecutor's offer suggests. As a result, innocent defendants tend to reject offers while guilty defendants tend to accept that innocent defendants will reject prosecutors' plea offers and instead will proceed to trial backed by the belief that their factual innocence will protect them from conviction. 103 One commentator noted that supporters of the plea-bargaining system believe "[p]lea agreements are not forced on defendants . . . they are only an option. Innocent defendants are likely to reject this option because they expect an acquittal at trial." 104 Such skeptics are in good company. Even the Supreme Court in its landmark Brady decision permitting bargained justice rejected concerns that innocent defendants would falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. 105 The Court stated:
We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the defendants' admissions that they committed the crimes with which they are charged.
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This sentiment was expressed by the Court again eight years later in Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 107 In Bordenkircher, the Court stated that as long as the defendant is free to accept or reject a plea bargain, it is unlikely an innocent defendant will be "driven to false self-condemnation."
108 Even those who argue that plea bargaining's innocence problem is exaggerated, however, rely mainly on speculation regarding how innocent defendants will respond in such situations. When an innocent defendant rationally chooses to plead guilty, the system should want to protect access. It should recognize that at least for the innocent defendant it is not bad that some deals are more than just sensible-they would be improvident to reject. Particularly where process costs are high and the consequences of conviction low, a bargained-for conviction of an innocent accused is no evil; it is the constructive minimization thereof-an unpleasant medicine softening the symptoms of separate affliction. The need by both sides of the innocence debate to gather more data regarding the extent to which innocent defendants might be vulnerable to the persuasive power of plea bargaining has led to numerous studies.
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Several legal scholars have conducted examinations of exoneration statistics in an effort to identify examples where innocent defendants were convicted by guilty pleas.
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Professor Samuel Gross conducted one of the most comprehensive studies in 2005.
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While Professor Gross's research explored exonerations in the United States broadly, he also specifically discussed plea bargaining's innocence problem. 113 His study stated that twenty of 340 exonerees had pleaded guilty. 114 Although Professor Gross found a relatively low number among those exonerated who falsely pleaded guilty, there are significant limitations to using this study to disprove the innocence problem surrounding guilty pleas.
115 Upon closer examination of this and other exoneration studies, one realizes that while exoneration data is vital to our understanding of wrongful convictions generally, it cannot accurately or definitively explain how likely innocent defendants are to 110 See infra note 111. 112 See Gross et al., supra note 111, at 523. 113 See id. at 524, 536. 114 Id. (observing that of this number, fifteen were murder defendants, four were rape defendants, and one was a gun-possession defendant facing life in prison as a habitual offender). Professor Gross goes on to note that in two cases of mass exoneration involving police misconduct, a subset of cases not included in his study, a significant number of the defendants pleaded guilty. See id. ("By contrast, thirty-one of the thirty-nine Tulia defendants pled guilty to drug offenses they did not commit, as did the majority of the 100 or more exonerated defendants in the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles.").
115 See Howe, supra note 100, at 631 ("Particularly if many innocent defendants who go to trial are acquitted, [Professor Gross's] figure does not support claims that innocent defendants are generally more risk averse regarding trials than factually guilty defendants or that prosecutors frequently persuade innocent defendants with irresistibly low plea offers."). Howe goes on, however, to caution those who might rely on this study in such a manner because of the difficulty in gaining an exoneration following a guilty plea as opposed to following a conviction by trial. See id.
plead guilty.
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As noted by other scholars in the field, three problems exist with exoneration data when applied to plea-bargaining research. 117 First, exoneration data predominantly focuses on serious felony cases such as murder or rape where there is available DNA evidence and where the defendants' sentences are lengthy enough for the exoneration process to work its way through the system. 118 This means that exoneration data does not examine the role of innocence and plea bargaining in the vast majority of criminal cases, those not involving murder or rape, including misdemeanor cases.
119 Second, because many individuals who plead guilty do so in return for a reduced sentence, it is highly likely that innocent defendants who plead guilty have little incentive or insufficient time to pursue exoneration. 120 Finally, even if some innocent defendants who pleaded guilty had the desire and time to move for exoneration, many would be prohibited from challenging their convictions by the mere fact that they had pleaded guilty. ) (discussing restrictions on the ability of defendants who pleaded guilty to utilize postconviction DNA testing); see also Howe, supra note 100, at 631 ("Those relying on [Professor Gross's] study, however, should do so cautiously. The proportion of false convictions due to guilty pleas probably exceeds the exoneration figure from the study, because pleading guilty, as opposed to being convicted after trial, likely makes subsequent exoneration more difficult.").
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[Vol. 103 therefore, it is highly likely that the true extent of plea bargaining's innocence problem is significantly underestimated by these studies.
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Consequently, one must look elsewhere to determine the true likelihood that an innocent defendant might falsely condemn himself in return for an offer of leniency in the form of a plea bargain.
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One such source of information are psychological studies regarding plea bargaining and the decisionmaking processes of defendants in the criminal justice system. 124 Unfortunately, these studies are also problematic and fail to resolve definitively plea bargaining's innocence debate because the majority merely employ vignettes in which participants are asked to imagine themselves as guilty or innocent and faced with a hypothetical decision regarding whether to accept or reject a plea offer. 125 As a result of the utilization of such imaginary and hypothetical scenarios, these studies are unable to capture either the full impact of a defendant's knowledge that she is factually innocent or the true gravity of the choices she must make when standing before the criminal justice system accused of a crime she did 122 Even Professor Gross acknowledges that his study fails to capture many innocent defendants who plead guilty. In concluding his discussion regarding the Tulia and Rampart mass exoneration cases, he notes that these cases received attention because they involved large-scale police corruption. He goes on to state, "If these same defendants had been falsely convicted of the same crimes by mistake-or even because of unsystematic acts of deliberate dishonesty-we would never have known. Nevertheless, these studies do offer some preliminary insights into the world of the innocent defendant's dilemma.
One of the first psychological studies attempting to understand a defendant's plea-bargaining decisionmaking process through the use of vignettes was conducted by Professors Larry Gregory, John Mowen, and Darwyn Linder in 1984 (Gregory study). 127 In the Gregory study, students were asked to "imagine that they were innocent or guilty of having committed an armed robbery." 128 The students were then presented with the evidence against them and asked to make a decision regarding whether they would plead guilty or proceed to trial. 129 As might be expected, the study revealed that students imagining themselves to be guilty were significantly more likely to plead guilty than those who were imagining themselves to be innocent. 130 In the experiment, 18% of the "innocent" students and 83% of the "guilty" students pleaded guilty. 131 While these results might lend support to the argument that few innocent defendants in the criminal justice system falsely condemn themselves-if you can consider 18% to be an insignificant number-the study suffered from its utilization of hypotheticals. 132 As has been shown in social psychological studies for decades, what people say they will do in a hypothetical situation 126 See supra note 125. 127 See Gregory et al., supra note 125. 128 Id. at 1522. The Gregory study involved 143 students. Interestingly, the study only utilized male participants. The study stated, "Since most armed robberies are committed by men, only male students were used." Id. The methodological explanation went on to describe the particulars of the study:
After listening to a tape recording of their defense attorney's summary of the evidence that would be presented for and against them at their trial, students opened an experimental booklet that contained information about the charges against them (four versus one), the punishment they would face if convicted (ten to fifteen years in prison versus one to two years in prison), and the details of the plea bargain that was offered them. Students then indicated whether they accepted or rejected the plea bargain, responded to manipulation checks, indicated their perceived probability of conviction, and indicated how sure their defense attorney and the judge were of their innocence or guilt.
Id.
129 Id. The study also discussed the results of different students facing differing punishments and numbers of charges. The study found that the severity of punishment and the number of charges only affected the guilty condition, not the innocent condition. Those in the guilty condition behaved as would be expected: most likely to accept a plea with a large number of charges and a severe penalty attached (100%), and least likely with a few number of charges and a low penalty attached (63%). The innocent defendants had a low rate of plea bargaining regardless of condition (11%-33% Perhaps acknowledging the unreliable nature of a study relying merely on vignettes to explore such an important issue, Gregory attempted to create a more realistic innocent defendant's dilemma in a subsequent experiment. 134 In the study, students were administered a "difficult exam after being given prior information by a confederate that most of the answers were 'B' (guilty condition) or after being given no information (innocent condition)." 135 After the test, the students were accused of the "crime" of having prior knowledge of the answers and told they would have to appear before an ethics committee. 136 The participants were then offered a plea bargain that required their immediate admission of guilt in return for a less severe punishment. 137 Unfortunately, the second study was only successfully administered to sixteen students, too few to draw any significant conclusions. 138 Nevertheless, Gregory was finally on the right path to answering the lingering question pervading plea bargaining's innocence debate. How likely is it that an innocent defendant might falsely plead guilty to a crime he or she did not commit? 138 See id. at 1528. The results of the second study by Gregory and colleagues were that six of eight guilty students accepted the deal and zero of eight innocent students accepted the deal. See id. These findings led to further research regarding the effect of an innocent defendant's belief that he or she would succeed at trial. In their work regarding fairness and plea negotiations, Tor, Gazal-Ayal, and Garcia showed that "guilty" participants were more likely to accept a plea than the "innocent" participants. See Tor et al., supra note 102, at 113-14. 139 See infra Part IV (discussing the results of the authors' plea-bargaining study). Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. 141 Prosecutors alleged that one such company was Broadcom, a large semiconductor manufacturer in California. 142 After Broadcom restated $2.2 billion in charges because of backdating in January 2007, the government indicted Dr. Henry Samueli, cofounder and former Chief Technical Officer of the company. 143 Dr. Samueli pleaded guilty and, as part of his deal, agreed to testify for the prosecution against Henry T. Nicholas III, Broadcom's other cofounder, and William J. Ruehle, the company's Chief Financial Officer. 144 After Dr. Samueli offered his testimony at trial, however, U.S. District Judge Cormac J. Carney voided Dr. Samueli's guilty plea, dismissed the charges against all the defendants, and called the prosecutors' actions a "shameful" campaign of intimidation. 145 The judge stated in open court that "there was no evidence at trial to suggest that Dr. Samueli did anything wrong, let alone criminal. Yet, the government embarked on a campaign of intimidation and other misconduct to embarrass him and bring him down." The judge went on to state, "One must conclude that the government engaged in this misconduct to pressure Dr. Samueli to falsely admit guilt and incriminate [the other defendants] or, if he was unwilling to make such a false admission and incrimination, to destroy Dr. Samueli's credibility as a witness for [the other defendants]." 146 With this unusual public rebuke of the prosecutorial tactics that forced an innocent defendant into a plea bargain, the judge in the Broadcom case demonstrated once again the existence of the innocent defendant's dilemma.
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While the Gregory study attempted to capture the likelihood that an innocent defendant such as Dr. Samueli might falsely plead guilty, the study's utilization of hypotheticals prevented it from offering an accurate glimpse inside the mind of the accused. 148 Shortly before the Broadcom prosecution, however, a study regarding police interrogation tactics utilizing an experimental design similar to Gregory's second study offered a path forward for plea bargaining's innocence inquiry. 149 In 2005, Professors Melissa Russano, Christian Meissner, Fadia Narchet, and Saul Kassin initiated a study (Russano study) in which students were accused by a research assistant of working together after being instructed this was (noting that in an attempt to pressure defendant Nicholas, the government had "threatened to force Nicholas' [thirteen]-year-old son to testify about his father and drugs"). Judge Carney listed some of the prosecution's misconduct as the following:
Among other wrongful acts, the Government, one, unreasonably demanded that Dr. Samueli submit to as many as 30 grueling interrogations by the lead prosecutor.
Two, falsely stated and improperly leaked to the media that Dr. Samueli was not cooperating in the Government's investigation.
Three, improperly pressured Broadcom to terminate Dr. Samueli's employment and remove him from the board.
Four, misled Dr. Samueli into believing that the lead prosecutor would be replaced because of misconduct.
Five, obtained an inflammatory indictment that referred to Dr. Samueli 72 times and accused him of being an unindicted coconspirator when the government knew, or should have known, that he did nothing wrong.
And six, crafted an unconscionable plea agreement pursuant to which Dr. Samueli would plead guilty to a crime he did not commit and pay a ridiculous sum of $12 million to the United States Treasury.
Transcript of Proceedings, Ruehle, supra note 145, at 5198.
147 See Koehler, supra note 142, at 941 ("In pleading guilty, Samueli did what a 'disturbing number of other people have done: pleaded guilty to a crime they didn't commit or at least believed they didn't commit' for fear of exercising their constitutional right to a jury trial, losing, and 'getting stuck with a long prison sentence.'" (citation omitted)); Ribstein, supra note 94, at 630 ("In the Broadcom backdating case, particularly egregious prosecutorial conduct caused defendants to plead guilty to crimes they knew they had not committed . . prohibited. 150 Some of the students accused of this form of "cheating" were, in fact, guilty of the charge, while others were not. 151 Russano wanted to test the effect of two types of police interrogation on the rates of guilty and innocent suspects confessing to the alleged crime. 152 The first interrogation tactic utilized to exact admissions from the students was minimization.
153
Minimization is the process by which interrogators minimize the seriousness and anticipated consequences of the suspect's conduct. 154 The second interrogation tactic utilized to exact admissions from the students involved offering the students a "deal."
155 Students were told that if they confessed, the matter would be resolved quickly and they would merely be required to return to retake the test at a later date. 156 If the students rejected the offer, the consequences were unknown and would be decided later by the course's professor. 157 Russano found that utilizing these tactics together, 43% of students falsely confessed and 87% of students truthfully confessed.
158
When only the "deal" was offered, however, only 14% of the students in Russano's study falsely confessed.
159
150 See id. at 481. 151 See id. at 482 ("In the current paradigm, participants were accused of breaking an experimental rule, an act that was later characterized as 'cheating.'"). 152 See id. at 481 ("In the first demonstration of this paradigm, we explored the influence of two common police interrogation tactics: minimization and an explicit offer of leniency, or a 'deal.'"). 153 See id. at 482. 154 See id.
Researchers have categorized the interrogation methods promoted by interrogation manuals into two general types, namely, maximization and minimization. Maximization involves so-called scare tactics designed to intimidate suspects: confronting them with accusations of guilt, refusing to accept their denials and claims of innocence, and exaggerating the seriousness of the situation. This approach may also include presenting fabricated evidence to support the accusation of guilt (e.g., leading suspects to think that their fingerprints were lifted from the murder weapon). In contrast, minimization encompasses strategies such as minimizing the seriousness of the offense and the perceived consequences of confession, and gaining the suspect's trust by offering sympathy, understanding, and face-saving excuses.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
. 155 See id. 156 See id. at 483. 157 See id. ("They were also told that if they did not agree to sign the statement, the experimenter would have to call the professor into the laboratory, and the professor would handle the situation as he saw fit, with the strong implication being that the consequences would likely be worse if the professor became further involved."). 158 See id. at 484. 159 See id.
Condition True Confessions False Confessions
No Tactic 46% 6%
In 2011, utilizing the Russano study as a guide, we constructed a new investigatory paradigm that would better reflect the mechanics of the criminal justice system and more precisely focus the inquiry on the innocent defendant's dilemma. 160 The new study was administered to eighty-two students from a small, southeastern, private technical university. 161 The results of the study were significant and established what Gregory and Russano had hinted at in their earlier forays into the plea-bargaining machine.
A. STUDY METHODOLOGY-CONFRONTING A DEVIL'S BARGAIN
Participants in the study were all college students at a small technical university in the southeastern United States. 163 The study participants had each signed up for what they believed was a psychological inquiry into individual versus group problem-solving performance. When a study participant arrived for the problem-solving experiment, he or she was met by another student pretending to be participating in the exercise also. Unbeknownst to the study participant, however, the second student was actually a confederate working with the authors. 164 At this point, a research assistant, also working with the authors, led the two students into a private room and explained the testing procedures. 165 The research assistant
Deal
72% 14%
Minimization
81% 18%
Minimization + Deal 87% 43%
Id. at tbl.1. 160 See infra Part III.B (discussing the results of the authors' plea-bargaining study). 161 See id. 162 See id. 163 See Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Pleading Innocents: Laboratory Evidence of Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem 9 (2012) (unpublished short research report) (on file with authors). The study was administered to eighty-two students. Id. Six students were removed from the study because of their suspicion as to the study's actual focus, an inability to complete the study, or a refusal to assist the confederate when asked to render assistance in answering the questions. Id. Thus, seventy-six participants remained. Id. Of this number, thirty-one indicated they were female and forty-five indicated they were male. Id. Of the study population, 52.6% identified as Caucasian, 21.1% identified as African-American, 13.2% identified as Hispanic, 5.3% identified as Asian, and 7.9% identified as "Other." Id. at 10. Forty-eight students identified themselves as U.S. citizens, while twenty-eight students identified themselves as non-U.S. citizens. Id. 164 See id. Two female students served as confederates in the study. One was twenty years of age and the other was twenty-one years of age. 165 See id. Two research assistants were used in this experiment. One research assistant was a twenty-seven-year-old male. The other was a twenty-four-year-old female.
informed the students that they would be participating in an experiment about performance on logic problems. According to the research assistant, the two students would be left alone to complete three logic problems together as a team. 166 The research assistant then informed them that after the first problems were completed, the students would receive three additional logic problems that must be completed individually. When these problems were distributed, the research assistant's script required the following statement, "Now I will hand out the individual problems, remember that you are to work alone. I will give you 15 minutes to complete these."
While the study participant and the confederate were solving the individual logic problems, one of two conditions would occur. In half of the cases, the confederate asked the study participant for assistance in answering the questions, a clear violation of the research assistant's explicit instructions. First, the confederate asked the study participant, "What did you get for number 2?" If the study participant did not respond with the answer, the confederate followed up by saying, "I think it is 'D' because [some scripted reasoning based on the specifics of the problem]." Finally, if necessary, the confederate would ask, "Did you get 'E' for # 3?" 167 It is worth noting that all but two study participants asked by the confederate to offer assistance violated the requirement that each student work alone. 168 Those study participants offering assistance were placed in the "guilty condition," because they had "cheated" by violating the research assistant's instructions. In the other half of the cases, the confederate sat quietly and did not ask the study participant for assistance. 169 The study participants in We are studying the performance of individuals versus groups on logic problems. You will be given three logic problems to work through together and then three problems to work through on your own. It is very important that you work on the individual problems alone. You have 15 minutes for each set of problems. Even if you run out of time, you must circle an answer for each question. First, you'll be working on the group problems. I will leave the room and be back in 15 minutes. If you finish before that time, one of you can duck your head out the door and let me know.
Id.
167 See id. at 20. The study protocols also instructed the confederate that "[i]f they [the study participant] refuse after this prodding, stop asking and record (on the demographic sheet, at the end of the study) that the individual was in the cheat condition but refused to cheat. Give specific points explaining what you tried to do to instigate the cheating." Id.
168 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 10. The two students who refused to offer assistance were removed from the study. 169 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 166, at 20. The study protocol stated: [Vol. 103 this scenario were placed in the "innocent condition," because they had not "cheated" by violating the research assistant's instructions. After completing the second set of logic problems, the research assistant, who did not know whether cheating had occurred, collected the logic problems and asked that the students remain in the room for a few minutes while the problems were graded. 170 Approximately five minutes later, the research assistant reentered the room and said, "We have a problem. I'm going to need to speak with each of you individually." The research assistant looked at the sign-in sheet and read off the confederate's name and the two then left the room together. Five minutes later, the research assistant reentered the room, sat down near the student, and made the following statement.
You and the other student had the same wrong answer on the second and third individual questions. The chances of you both getting the exact same wrong answer are really small-in fact they are like less than 4%-because of this, when this occurs, we are required to report it to the professor in charge and she may consider this a form of academic dishonesty.
171
In early trials of the study design, it was determined that study participants did not understand how getting the same wrong answer on questions two and three indicated they may have cheated. As a result, there was a perception that no actual evidence of guilt existed. Because actual criminal trials involve evidence of guilt, even trials where the individual is actually innocent, it was determined that the study would more accurately capture the criminal process if one piece of evidence leading to the accusation was explained. Therefore, as described above, the subject was informed that statistically, given that there were five available choices for each question, there was only a 4% chance that the students provided the same incorrect answers by coincidence. This explanation of the logic behind the research assistant's accusation certainly did not mean the subject was guilty. To the contrary, the research assistant actually noted that there Do not speak to the participant and do not respond if they ask for assistance.
Be sure that the participant cannot see what answers you are choosing-he/she needs to believe that you both answered two questions the same way and if they see your paper they may know that this was not the case. We need to make sure that no matter what, cheating does NOT occur in this condition.
Id.
170 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 10-11. The research assistants were not informed of whether cheating had occurred to ensure that their approach to each study participant-during the plea-bargaining component of the study-was consistent and not influenced by omnipotent knowledge of guilt or innocence that would not be available to a prosecutor or investigator in the actual criminal justice system. 171 Id. at 11.
was a 4% chance there was no cheating. As with all studies of this nature, difficult decisions must be made in an effort to create as realistic an environment as possible. While some might argue that mentioning the statistical evidence leading to the accusation might lead to a perception of an overly strong case against the study participant, it was decided that the benefits of explaining the reasoning for the charge outweighed any potential influence this data might have on the study results.
172
To ensure the study participant was unable to argue that he had answered questions two and three correctly, the second set of logic questions were designed to have no correct answer. The research assistant then informed the student that this had occurred before and she had been given authority to offer two alternatives.
173
The first alternative the research assistant offered was a "plea" in which the study participant would be required to admit he or she cheated and, as punishment, would lose all compensation promised for participating in the experiment.
174
This particular offer was made to all study participants and was constructed to be akin to an offer of probation or time served in the actual criminal justice system. 175 The research assistant then offered each study participant one of 172 This conclusion was reached for several reasons. First, an actual criminal case should not reach the trial stage without at least one piece of significant evidence or a multitude of smaller pieces of evidence. As such, in designing the study, we did not believe offering this single piece of evidence would unduly influence the subject's decisionmaking or unreasonably influence the study's results. Second, it is difficult in a short study to build the same, often complex, foundation that is inherent in a criminal case. To rectify this inherent design limitation, we devised one simple piece of evidence to explain the basis for the accusation. The offered explanation, however, did leave room for the possibility that the individual was innocent, thus allowing the subject an argument upon which to rely in professing their innocence during the plea-negotiation process or during a trial before the ARB. Third, even though many innocent defendants may not be confronted with as strong an indicator of guilt, it does not change the fact that any innocent defendant, no matter the evidence, necessarily falls within the margins of a case where there is evidence pointing to guilt, but the defendant is, in fact, innocent. Even if our margin is smaller than most, the argument could be made that it does not change the fact that the person is innocent and, according to many commentators, should be motivated to maintain that innocence and proceed to trial. 173 See id. The research assistants also informed the study participants that this situation had arisen before and that the described protocol must be followed or the research assistants might lose their research positions. 174 See id. at 12. The compensation offered for participating in the study was research participation credit-something required for students to successfully complete their Introduction to Psychology course. 175 See id.; see also Bowers, supra note 102, at 1136-37.
The trial course is long; even if convicted, the defendant often has already served any postconviction sentence, and then some. In this way, conviction may counterintuitively inaugurate freedom. Moreover, the costs of conviction are minimal; an additional misdemeanor two alternative options if the plea offer was rejected. In roughly half of the cases (referred to as the "harsh sentencing condition"), the research assistant informed the student that if the "deal" was not accepted, the professor leading the experiment would bring the matter before the Academic Review Board (ARB). The research assistant explained that the ARB was a group of ten to twelve faculty and staff members that ruled on such matters. To make the ARB sound similar to a jury in an actual criminal trial, the research assistant described it as being a forum in which the student had the option of telling his or her version of events, presenting evidence, and arguing for his or her position. Again, to better reflect the actual mechanics of the criminal justice system, the research assistant also informed the student that "the majority of students, like 80-90%, are usually found guilty" before the ARB. This percentage was selected and communicated because it is consistent with the actual current conviction rate of defendants proceeding to trial in the United States. 176 While it is impossible to predict how common it is for defense counsel to relate such statistics to their clients, we believed that this information would, at a minimum, be considered by counsel during their own assessment of the case and in preparing to advise their clients of the risks and rewards of each option. As such, we felt it important to offer this information to the participants in this study to utilize during their personal assessment processes. The research assistant then informed the student that if he or she were "convicted" by the ARB, she would lose her study compensation, her faculty advisor would be notified, and she would have to enroll in an ethics course that met for three hours each week during the semester. The course was described as a pass/fail class that would be offered free of charge, but it would require mandatory weekly attendance and the completion of a paper and a final examination.
In roughly the other half of the cases (referred to as the "lenient sentencing condition"), the research assistant provided the same information to the student regarding the ARB process, but informed the student that if he was "convicted" by the ARB, he would lose his study conviction does little to further mar an already-soiled record because the recidivist defendant has already suffered most of the corollary consequences that typically stem from convictions. If the defendant can get a plea to a misdemeanor and time served, then the process constitutes the whole punishment. Any plea that frees this defendant may be more than advisable-it may be salvation. No matter how certain of acquittal, she is better off pleading guilty. She is the defendant who benefits most from plea bargaining, and she is the very defendant who most frequently is innocent in fact.
Bowers, supra note 102, at 1136-37 (footnotes omitted).
176 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 12; see also Gregory et al., supra note 125, at 1529. compensation, his faculty advisor would be notified, and he would undergo nine hours of ethics training in the form of three three-hour seminars. The seminars were described as free of charge but requiring mandatory attendance and the completion of a final examination. Half the students were offered the harsh sentencing condition and the other half were offered the lenient sentencing condition to test the impact of "sentencing differentials" on the rate of innocent and guilty students accepting the plea offer rather than proceeding to trial before the ARB.
Once the study participants were presented with their options of pleading guilty or proceeding to the ARB, the research assistant presented them each with a piece of paper. The paper outlined their options and asked that they circle their selection.
177
To ensure study participants did not become distraught under the pressure of the scenario, the research assistant was instructed to terminate the experiment and debrief the student regarding the true nature of the study if he or she took too long to select an option, seemed overly stressed, or tried to leave the room.
B. STUDY RESULTS-THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT'S DILEMMA EXPOSED
While academic discipline is not precisely equivalent to traditional criminal penalties, the anxiety experienced by students anticipating punishment is similar in form, if not intensity, to the anxiety experienced by an individual charged with a criminal offense. As such, this study sought to recreate the innocent defendant's dilemma in as real a manner as possible by presenting two difficult and discernible choices to students and asking them to make a decision. This is the same mentally anguishing decision defendants in the criminal justice system must make every day. 179 While it 177 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 166, at 17-18. The research assistants had scripted answers to common questions that might be asked while the students deliberated on their choices. For example, answers were prepared for questions such as "I didn't do it," "What did the other person say?" "How can I be in trouble if this isn't a class?" etc. This was done to ensure the research assistants' interactions with the study participants were uniform and consistent. See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 12.
178 See id. After making their selection, the study participants were probed for suspicion and eventually debriefed regarding the true nature of the experiment. During this debriefing process, the students were informed that helping other students outside the classroom setting was a very kind action and that they were, in fact, in no trouble. The research assistants ensured that prior to leaving the room, the study participants understood that the nature of the study needed to remain confidential. 179 See id. One important distinction between the experimental methodology used in the authors' study and previous studies is that the former included a definitive top end to the sentencing differential. This better reflects the reality of modern sentencing, particularly in jurisdictions utilizing sentencing guidelines, and thus better captures the decisionmaking [Vol. 103 was anticipated that this plea-bargaining study would reveal that innocent students, just like innocent defendants, sometimes plead guilty to an offense they did not commit in return for promises of leniency, the rate at which such false pleas occurred exceeded our estimations and should lead to a reevaluation of the role and method of plea bargaining today.
Pleading Rates for Guilty and Innocent Students
As had been anticipated, both guilty and innocent students accepted the plea bargain and confessed to the alleged conduct. 180 In total, almost nine out of ten guilty study participants accepted the deal, while slightly fewer than six out of ten innocent study participants took the same path. 181 See id. at 13. We conducted a three-way loglinear analysis to test the effects of guilt (guilt vs. innocence) and type of sanction (lenient vs. harsh) on the participant's decision to accept the plea bargain. The highest order interaction (guilt x sanction x plea) was not significant,  2 (1, N = 76) = 0.26, p = 0.61. What was significant was the interaction between guilt and plea,  2 (1, N = 76) = 10.95, p < 0.01. To break down this effect, a separate chisquare test was performed looking at guilt and plea, collapsed across type of sanction. Applying the continuity correction for a 2 x 2 contingency table, there was a significant effect of guilt,  2 (1, N = 76) = 8.63, p < 0.01, with the odds ratio indicating that those who were guilty were 6.38 times more likely to accept a plea than those who were innocent.
Two important conclusions stem from these results. 182 First, as had been predicted by others, guilty defendants are more likely to plead guilty than innocent defendants.
183
In our study, guilty defendants were 6.39 times more likely to accept a plea than innocent defendants given the same sentencing options.
184
Figure 2 Percentage of Students by Condition (Guilty or Innocent)
Accepting the Plea Offer While Professor Covey concedes that his examination of case studies only permits "some tentative comparisons," it is fascinating to observe that the actions of the defendants in these two massexoneration cases mirror the actions of our study participants. As the numbers reflect, guilty defendants in Professor Covey's mass exoneration cases acted almost exactly as did guilty students in our experiment. 188 In both cases, nine out of ten guilty individuals accepted the deal. 189 While not as precise, in both the mass-exoneration cases and the plea-bargaining study, well over half of innocent individuals also selected the bargain over proceeding to trial. 190 These similarities not only lend credibility to the results of our new study, but once again support the arguments of those who previously predicted that plea bargaining's 186 See id. (examining the mass exonerations in the Rampart case in California and the Tulia case in Texas). 187 See id. at 34.
Although the numbers are small, they are large enough to permit some tentative comparison.
With respect to plea rates, the data show that innocence does appear to make some difference . . . . Actually innocent exonerees thus plead guilty at a rate of 77%. In comparison, 22 of those who were not actually innocent pled guilty while 3 were convicted at trial. In other words, 88% of those who were not innocent pled guilty. Finally, of the remaining group of "may be innocents," 17 pled guilty while two were convicted at trial, providing an 89% guilty plea rate. innocence problem affected more than just an isolated few.
Id
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The second and, perhaps, more important conclusion stemming from the study is that well over half of the innocent study participants, regardless of whether the lenient or harsh sentencing condition was employed, were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a reduced punishment.
192
Previous research has argued that plea bargaining's innocence problem is minimal because defendants are risk prone and willing to defend themselves before a tribunal. 193 Our research, however, demonstrates that when study participants are placed in real, rather than hypothetical, bargaining situations and are presented with accurate information regarding their statistical probability of success, just as they might be so informed by their attorneys or the government during criminal plea negotiations, innocent individuals are actually highly risk averse.
194
Based on examination of the detailed notes compiled during the debriefing of each study participant, two common concerns drove the participants' risk-averse behavior. First, study participants sought to avoid the ARB process and move directly to punishment. 195 Second, study 191 See Bowers, supra note 102, at 1136-37. 192 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 5. While design constraints prevented the incorporation of counsel into our study, we believe that this omission does not lessen the significance of these findings. First, while the presence of counsel may have resulted in a slight shift in outcomes, it is unlikely such representation would have dramatically altered the study results because the underlying decisionmaking factors presented to the participants would remain the same. Second, it is important to note that many individuals in the U.S. criminal justice system proceed without counsel. See SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 67, at 9. Finally, the results of this study are relevant for other institutions employing models based on the criminal justice system, many of which do not utilize an equivalent to counsel. That students will acquiesce in such a manner should not only bring the criminal justice system's use of plea bargaining into question, but also all other similar forms of adjudication throughout society. For example, this would include reevaluation of student conduct procedures that contain offers of leniency in return for admissions of guilt.
193 See Tor et al., supra note 102, at 106 (arguing based on a study utilizing an email questionnaire that innocent defendants are risk prone and on average were willing to proceed to trial rather than accept a plea); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2507 (2004) ("Defendants' attitudes toward risk and loss will powerfully shape their willingness to roll the dice at trial.").
194 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 6; see also Bibas, supra note 193, at 2509 (discussing risk aversion and loss aversion). Professor Bibas notes that "most people are inclined to gamble to avoid sure losses and inclined to avoid risking the loss of sure gains; they are risk averse, but they are even more loss averse. When these gains and losses are uncertain probabilities rather than certain, determinate amounts, the phenomenon is reversed." Id.
195 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 6; see also Bowers, supra note 102, at 1136-37.
Likewise, over fifty percent of all misdemeanor charges that ended in conviction resulted in When Russano's interrogators did not use any tactics to elicit a confession, the diagnosticity of the interrogation process was 7.67. 208 By comparison, when Russano's interrogators applied two interrogation tactics, the number of false confessions jumped to almost 50% and the diagnosticity of the process dropped to 2.02. 209 This drop in diagnosticity meant that as Russano applied various interrogation tactics, the ability of the interrogation procedure to identify only guilty subjects diminished. 210 Taken to the extreme, if one were to torture a suspect during interrogation, one would anticipate a diagnosticity of 1.0, which would indicate that the process was just as likely to capture innocent as guilty defendants.
211
In our study, the diagnosticity of the plea-bargaining process utilized was extremely low, a mere 1.54. 212 That the diagnosticity of our pleabargaining process was considerably lower than the diagnosticity of Russano's combined interrogation tactics is significant. 213 First, it is important to note that plea bargaining's diagnosticity in this study was strikingly low, despite the fact that our process did not threaten actual prison time or deprivations of significant liberty interests as happens every day in the actual criminal justice system. 214 Further, this diagnosticity result indicates that innocent defendants may be more vulnerable to coercion in the plea-bargaining phase of their proceedings than even during a police interrogation. While much focus has been given to increasing constitutional protections during police interrogations over the last half-century, perhaps the Supreme Court should begin focusing more attention on creating protections within the plea-bargaining process.
The other important aspect of our study's diagnosticity data is that the diagnosticities of the harsh and lenient sentencing conditions were very similar. 216 This was surprising, because it had been anticipated that the efficiency of the process would suffer greatly as we increased the punishment risked at trial. 217 That the diagnosticity did not drop in this way when the harsh sentencing condition was applied means further research is necessary to better understand the true impact of sentencing differentials.
Though further research is warranted, we suggest two hypotheses that might offer an explanation of the diagnosticity element of this study. First, perhaps future studies will demonstrate that diagnosticity here did not drop significantly because it had little place left to go. 218 The diagnosticity for the lenient sentencing condition was already at 1.62, which, as discussed above, is exceptionally low. That it did not drop meaningfully below this threshold when the sentencing differential was increased, therefore, may not be surprising, particularly given that a diagnosticity of 1.0 would mean that sentence severity had no ability to predict truthful plea deals. 219 Second, perhaps future studies will reveal that the diagnosticity of our pleabargaining process began so low and failed to drop significantly when a harsher sentencing condition was applied because sentencing differentials operate in a manner other than previously predicted. 220 Until now, many observers have predicted that sentencing differentials operate in a linear fashion (Figure 5 ), which means there is a direct relationship between the size of the sentencing differential and the likelihood a defendant will accept the bargain. It may be the case, however, that plea bargaining actually operates as a "cliff." This means that a particularly small sentencing differential may have little to no likelihood of inducing a defendant to plead guilty ( Figure  6 ). However, once the sentencing differential reaches a critical size, its ability to immediately and markedly influence the decisionmaking process of a defendant, whether guilty or innocent, becomes almost overwhelming.
222 Such a cliff effect would result in similar diagnosticities for both the harsh and lenient sentencing conditions because, once the critical size is reached, there is little additional impact that can be gained from further increasing the size of the differential. If future research indicates that this cliff effect is occurring, then these findings will be significant for at least three reasons. First, this might mean that while research suggesting that the answer to plea bargaining's innocence problem is better control of sentencing differentials is on the right track, such proposals will have to account for the cliff effect in selecting precisely how significant a differential to permit. 223 Without such consideration, it is possible that a proposed limitation on sentencing differentials that permitted incentives beyond the cliff would have little positive impact on the coercive nature of subsequent plea offers. Second, if such cliffs exist and are reached relatively quickly, as was the case in this study, consideration must be given to limiting the size of sentencing differentials more drastically then previously proposed. 224 Finally, future research regarding such cliffs might reveal precise mechanisms through which to increase the efficiency of the plea-bargaining system. For example, if it were revealed that guilty defendants required a smaller sentencing differential to reach their cliff, limiting sentencing differentials to such a size would simultaneously create a significant enough incentive for most guilty defendants to plead and not so great an incentive as to capture innocent ones. While further research is necessary to understand this possible phenomenon better, consideration must now be given to the implications of a possible finding that small sentencing differentials are more powerful than previously predicted and operate in a very different way than previously assumed.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT'S DILEMMA
In 1970, the same year the Supreme Court ruled that plea bargaining was a permissible form of justice in the Brady decision, the Court also accepted the case of North Carolina v. Alford ) (discussing the benefits of fixed-plea discounts, including that such fixed discounts "prevent prosecutors from offering discounts so large that innocent defendants are essentially coerced to plead guilty to avoid the risk of a dramatically harsher sentence"); see also Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 81 ("Dean Vorenberg suggests that a sentence discount of ten or twenty percent should encourage the requisite number of desired pleas. This figure appears to be a reasonable one with which to begin . . . . Excessive sentence discounts should be constitutionally suspect because they place a burden on the defendant's exercise of constitutional rights and negate the voluntary nature of his plea."). 224 Gifford, supra note 223, at 81. Following their convictions, the three young men continued to maintain their innocence and gradually, publicity regarding the case began to grow.
238 Though many had argued for years that the West Memphis Three were innocent of the alleged offense, concern regarding the case reached a crescendo in 2007 after DNA testing conducted on items from the crime scene failed to match any of the three. 239 Significantly, however, the DNA testing did find a match. 240 Hair from the ligatures used to bind one of the victims matched Terry Hobbs, one of the victims' stepfathers.
241
Though Hobbs had claimed not to have seen the murdered boys at all on the day of their disappearance, several witnesses came forward after the DNA test results were released to say they had seen him with the boys shortly 235 239 See Leveritt, supra note 232, at 151-52. In considering the significance of plea bargaining's innocence problem, one must also consider how likely it is that police inadvertently target the wrong suspect in a particular case-something that might eventually lead to an innocent suspect being offered a plea bargain in return for a false confession. See Thomas, supra note 111, at 576. Despite Risinger's wisdom about not attempting a global estimate of how many innocents are convicted, I continue to try to at least surround the problem. We do know some things for certain. An Institute of Justice monograph published in 1999 contained a study of roughly 21,000 cases in which laboratories compared DNA of the suspect with DNA from the crime scene. Remarkably, the DNA tests exonerated the prime suspect in 23% of the cases. In another 16%, the results were inconclusive. Because the inconclusive results must be removed from the sample, the police were wrong in one case in four. The prime suspect was innocent in one case out of four! Id. 240 See Leveritt, supra note 232, at 151. 241 See id. (discussing the release of this DNA evidence by singer Natalie Maines during a rally for the West Memphis Three). Further evidence in the case came to light as a result of a defamation lawsuit filed by Hobbs against Maines. Id. at 151-52. During a deposition in the defamation case, Hobbs stated that he had not seen the victims on the day of the murders. Id. When this information was released to the public, several witnesses came forward to state that they had seen Hobbs with the victims shortly before their disappearance. Id. before their murder. 242 By 2011, the newly discovered evidence in the case was deemed sufficient to call a hearing to determine if there should be a new trial. 243 For the prosecution, however, the prospect of retrying the defendants given the weak evidence offered at the original trial and the new evidence indicating the three might be innocent was unappealing. 244 According to the lead prosecutor, there was no longer sufficient evidence to convict the three at trial. 245 Despite the strong language in Alford indicating that it was appropriate only in cases where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and conviction at trial was almost ensured, the government offered the West Memphis Three a deal. 246 They could continue to maintain their innocence, but would be required to enter an Alford plea of guilty to the 1993 murders of the three boys. 247 In return, they would be released immediately. 248 While Baldwin was reluctant to accept the offer, he agreed to ensure Echols would be released from death row. 249 Baldwin stated, "[T]his was not justice. However, they're trying to kill Damien."
250 On August 19, 2011, the West Memphis Three walked out of an Arkansas courtroom free men, though they will live with the stigma and collateral consequences of their guilty pleas for the rest of their lives. 251 Whether they were guilty of the charged offenses may never be truly known, but it is clear that despite insufficient evidence to convict them at trial and strong indications that they were innocent, the three were enticed by the power of the plea-bargaining machine.
252
While the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for plea bargaining in Brady and approved bargained justice as a form of adjudication in the American criminal justice system, the Court also offered a cautionary note regarding the role of innocence. 253 At the same time the Court made clear its belief that innocent defendants were not vulnerable to the powers of bargained justice, the Court reserved the ability to reexamine the entire institution should it become evident it was mistaken. 254 The Court stated:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious-his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages-the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. 255 Continuing to focus more directly on the possibility of an innocence issue, the Court stated:
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazards for the innocent or that the methods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in this country are necessarily valid in all respects. This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or by trial. This caveat about the power of plea bargaining has been termed the Brady safety valve, because it allows the Supreme Court to reevaluate the constitutionality of bargained justice if the persuasiveness of plea offers becomes coercive and surpasses a point at which it begins to ensnarl an unacceptable number of innocent defendants. 257 Interestingly, Brady is not the only Supreme Court plea-bargaining case to include mention of the innocence issue and the safety valve. 258 In Safety-valves are intended to relieve pressure when forces within a machine become too great and, thereby, preserve the integrity of the machine. The Brady safety-valve serves just such a purpose by placing a limit on the amount of pressure that can constitutionally be placed on defendants to plead guilty. According to the Court, however, should plea bargaining become so common that prosecutors offer deals to all defendants, including those whose guilt is in question, and the incentives to bargain become so overpowering that even innocent defendants acquiesce, then the Brady safety-valve will have failed and the plea bargaining machine will have ventured into the realm of unconstitutionality.
Id.
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Alford, for instance, the Court made clear that this form of bargained justice was reserved only for cases where the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and sufficient to overcome easily the defendant's continued claims of innocence. 259 Where any uncertainty remained, the Supreme Court expected the case to proceed to trial to ensure that "guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice," rather than overwhelming force from the prosecution. 260 The same language requiring that plea bargaining be utilized in a manner that permits defendants to exercise their free will was contained in the 1978 case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 261 In Bordenkircher, the Court stated that the accused must be "free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." 262 Just as the Court had stated in Brady and Alford, it concluded its discussion in Bordenkircher by assuring itself that as long as such free choice existed and the pressure to plead guilty was not overwhelming, it would be unlikely that an innocent defendant might be "driven to false self-condemnation."
263
As is now evident from the study described herein, the Supreme Court was wrong to place such confidence in the ability of individuals to assert their right to trial in the face of grave choices. 264 In our research, more than half of the study participants were willing to forgo an opportunity to argue their innocence in court and instead falsely condemned themselves in return for a perceived benefit. 265 That the plea-bargaining system may operate in a manner vastly different from that presumed by the Supreme Court in 1970 and has the potential to capture far more innocent defendants than predicted means that the Brady safety valve has failed. Perhaps, therefore, it is time for the Court to reevaluate the constitutionality of the institution with an eye towards the true power and resilience of the plea-bargaining machine.
